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This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk
aversion and heterogeneous moral hazard. Each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single
closed-form equation. In assignment models without moral hazard, allocation depends only on firm
size and the equilibrium is efficient. Here, talent assignment is distorted by the agency problem as
firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay higher salaries
in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to
regulation) do not affect pay. The strength of incentives depends only on the disutility of effort and
is independent of risk and risk aversion. If the CEO affects the volatility as well as mean of firm returns,
incentives rise and are increasing in risk and risk aversion. We calibrate the efficiency losses from
various forms of poor corporate governance, such as failures in monitoring and inefficiencies in CEO
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This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives. Risk-
averse managers of diﬀerent talents are hired in a competitive market by heterogeneous ﬁrms,
which vary in their size, risk and level of eﬀort required. The level of pay drives the assignment
of talent to ﬁrms, and the strength of incentives induces optimal eﬀort.
Despite the potential complexity caused by combining a talent assignment model with an
agency problem under risk aversion, the equilibrium can be summarized by three simple, closed-
form equations, one for each of assignment, pay and incentives. The model’s tractability allow
its economic forces to be transparent, yields clear empirical predictions for which factors do and
do not matter for the three outcomes, and allows analysis of welfare consequences. Combining
these three questions within a unifying framework generates a number of new implications
unattainable from piecing together the results of individual models of each issue in isolation.
We start with assignment. As is standard, we model talent as aﬀecting the maximum ﬁrm
value that can be achieved in the absence of an agency problem. In a model without moral
hazard, more talented CEOs work at larger ﬁrms to allow their talent to have greatest impact.
We show that this allocation is distorted in the presence of an agency problem. A talented
manager is a mixed blessing for two reasons. First, if utility is multiplicative in cash and eﬀort,
exerting eﬀort is more costly to a talented and thus wealthy manager — for example, a day of
leisure is particularly valuable to a rich CEO as he can enjoy his wealth in leisure time. Thus,
the ﬁrm must pay a rich CEO a greater premium for disutility. Second, a manager who is
already wealthy is less motivated by incentive pay and more willing to sacriﬁce it for leisure.
The ﬁrm must therefore provide him with stronger incentives, which in turn requires paying a
higher premium for risk. Thus, ﬁrms involving greater risk or disutility must pay particularly
high premiums to hire talented managers, and so may prefer to appoint a “poor-and-hungry”
CEO rather than a “rich-and-contented” alternative. Some talented managers are hired by
small ﬁrms, where their talent has less eﬀect, because such ﬁrms involve lower risk or disutility.
Risk aversion thus not only leads to ineﬃcient risk-sharing, but also distortions in real produc-
tive activity. If ﬁrms also diﬀer in their sensitivity to talent, we have the natural additional
prediction that talented managers are assigned to ﬁrms with high growth opportunities.
We obtain closed-form solutions for the losses due to ineﬃcient risk-sharing and misal-
location. The former depends on the average level of risk in the economy; somewhat less
automatically, the latter depends on the cross-sectional variance of risk and not its mean. If
risk is high but constant across ﬁrms, it has no eﬀect on a CEO’s choice of employer and so the
assignment is not distorted. The losses from misallocating managers are also increasing in the
dispersion of managerial ability, as is intuitive. More surprisingly, they are decreasing in the
dispersion of ﬁrm size and the size elasticity of talent. When size is more dispersed, or talent
has a particularly strong impact on large ﬁrms, size becomes more important than risk in de-
termining the equilibrium matching. Thus, assignment becomes closer to the eﬃcient positive
2assortative matching on size. The sum of both ineﬃciencies is a measure of the losses from the
failure by boards to control moral hazard through direct monitoring — even if it can be fully
solved by contracts, such contracts create distortions. While it is well-known that incentive
pay causes ineﬃcient risk-sharing, we show that in a market equilibrium it also distorts real
production. Thus, direct monitoring and incentives are not perfect substitutes as governance
mechanisms. These losses are moderate: while the allocation is ﬁrst-best ineﬃcient compared
to a world with perfect monitoring, it is second-best eﬃcient given the existence of a moral
hazard problem — a social planner would not be able to improve on the allocation. By contrast,
if board failures instead lead to CEOs being randomly assigned to ﬁrms, the losses are greater
and now increasing in the dispersion of ﬁrm size and the size elasticity of talent. Our model
thus allows analysis of the losses from various manifestations of poor corporate governance.
Turning to the expected level of pay, it is increasing in ﬁrm size as in a pure assignment
model. The addition of an agency problem means that pay also depends on a ﬁrm’s disutility
and risk, as the CEO requires additional salary as compensation. Thus, ﬁrms with high risk
or disutility not only hire less talented CEOs, but also pay their CEOs highly (relative to their
skill level) as compensation. Cross-sectionally, riskier ﬁrms pay more as found by Garen (1994);
greater disutility of eﬀort has the same eﬀect. Gayle and Miller (2009) show theoretically and
empirically that, along the cross-section, ﬁrms which are more complex to manage or have
greater agency problems (and thus stronger required incentives) pay their executives more.
However, what matters is not the absolute level of these parameters, but their magnitudes
compared to other ﬁrms in the economy. Thus, aggregate changes in risk or the disutility of
being a CEO (e.g. due to regulation, stronger board monitoring or activist shareholders) do
not aﬀect pay — while working for one’s current ﬁrm becomes less attractive, so do the outside
options. This conclusion diﬀers from the partial equilibrium model of Hermalin (2005), which
argues that the recent strengthening in corporate governance increases the level of eﬀort the
CEO must exert and the risk of dismissal, and thus may explain the rise in pay over time. We
show that in a market equilibrium, such economy-wide changes have no eﬀect. Indeed, Peters
and Wagner (2009) ﬁnd that the eﬀect on pay of dismissal risk is around eight times as high
along the cross section as over the time series. The dependence of pay on economy-wide factors
also highlights the importance of controlling for aggregate conditions (or at least time trends)
in empirical analyses of the determinants of pay.
Third, the strength of incentives is measured by the percentage change in CEO pay for a
percentage ﬁrm return. Thus, when considering the contract in terms of the dollar change in
pay for a percentage ﬁrm return, the strength of incentives reﬂects the convexity of the contract.
Hence, a single parameter controls both the slope of the contract (in percent-percent terms)
and its convexity (in dollar-percent terms). This parameter depends only on the disutility of
eﬀort and is independent of both risk and risk aversion.
The above core model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we extend the model to allow
the CEO’s actions to aﬀect ﬁrm risk as well as the average return — for example, undertak-
3ing a risky, positive-NPV project augments both the mean and volatility. While diversiﬁed
shareholders do not care about idiosyncratic risk, a risk-averse CEO has private incentives to
ineﬃciently forgo such a project. Therefore, if the CEO is at least a risk-averse as a log utility
agent, the optimal contract becomes more convex to give the CEO a beneﬁtf r o mr i s kt oo ﬀset
h i sr i s ka v e r s i o n ;s i n c et h ei n c e n t i v em e a s u r er e p r e s e n t st h ec o n v e x i t yo ft h ec o n t r a c t ,t h i si n
turn involves stronger incentives. This result contrasts the argument that powerful incentives
induce the CEO to take excessive risk, and thus if the CEO has control over risk, incentives
should be weaker. Moreover, incentives are now increasing in risk and risk aversion, contrary to
traditional models which assume exogenous risk and predict a negative relationship. When the
CEO is more risk-averse or the ﬁrm is riskier, it is necessary to give him even more convexity
(and thus more incentives) to induce him to undertake a risky project. Indeed, Demsetz and
Lehn (1985), Core and Guay (1999) and Oyer and Schaefer (2004) ﬁnd a positive relationship
between incentives and risk. For the same reason, incentives are increasing in the marginal
increase in risk caused by value-enhancing actions. If the CEO mainly aﬀects ﬁrm value by
consuming perks, these actions have low eﬀect on risk and so incentives are little changed, but
if the CEO creates value by choosing risky projects, incentives must rise. The link between
incentives and the eﬀect of value-enhancing actions on risk has both cross-sectional and time-
series implications. Along the cross-section, “new economy” ﬁr m sh a v el i t t l et a n g i b l ec a p i t a l
and so enhancing ﬁrm value involves greater risk — for example, investing in R&D has a zero
payoﬀ if the R&D fails, whereas investing in an old economy plant has liquidation value in the
downside case. Indeed, Ittner, Lambert and Larcker (2003) and Murphy (2003) ﬁnd stronger
incentives in new economy ﬁrms. Over time, as industries mature and competition intensiﬁes
due to globalization, “sure-ﬁre” projects which generate value with little risk become scarce,
and enhancing ﬁrm value increasingly requires taking on risky projects. This may account for
the rise in incentives, and in particular options, over time (see, e.g., Jensen and Murphy (2004).)
Our ﬁnal theoretical extension allows for an elastic supply of CEO talent. We introduce a
second labor market involving non-CEO jobs (e.g. hedge funds, entrepreneurship, or consult-
ing), which we call the non-corporate sector. This market provides both a secondary source
from which corporate ﬁrms can hire, and an outside option for CEOs. An aggregate increase
in the disutility of being a CEO (while holding constant the disutility of working in the non-
corporate sector) now augments CEO pay, as ﬁrms must compensate CEOs to deter them from
leaving to the non-corporate sector. Since the additional disutility is particularly costly for
talented CEOs, corporate ﬁrms hire less skilled managers, reducing the value created by the
corporate sector. The magnitude of the rise in pay, downgrade in talent and value loss are all
increasing in the size of the non-corporate sector, as this represents the extent of CEOs’ outside
options. The value loss is also increasing in the aggregate salary paid to all corporate CEOs.
This is intuitive: in general, the economic importance of a distortion to a factor of production
is proportional to its marginal product; for a CEO, this is his salary.
The two-sector model can also be used to analyze the eﬀect of trends in a speciﬁc industry.
4For example, one “sector” could represent the ﬁnancial industry, and the second all alternative
jobs for such CEOs. An increase in regulation of the ﬁnancial industry (e.g. in response to
the recent crisis) may cause talented CEOs to leave. Since the outside options for ﬁnancial
CEOs are extensive (hedge funds and private equity houses in addition to executive positions
at non-ﬁnancial corporations), the value loss to the ﬁnancial industry may be substantial.
Finally, our model’s closed form solutions allow a calibration of the ineﬃciencies from vari-
ous forms of poor corporate governance. Aggregating over the 500 largest ﬁrms in Execucomp,
if monitoring failures mean that agency problems must be solved by contracting, we estimate
losses at from ineﬃcient risk-sharing at $1.7 billion per year, and misallocation at $7.4 billion;
the latter is an upper bound. The total ineﬃciency of $9 billion is approximately twice the
aggregate CEO salary; however, it is moderate since assignment is second-best eﬃcient and
contracting is optimal. By contrast, if board failures manifest in random assignments of CEOs
across ﬁrms while retaining optimal contracting, the losses are approximately $16 billion per
year as a lower bound. Naturally, all of these losses would be signiﬁcantly higher when con-
sidering all top executives rather than just CEOs. While recent critics of governance focus on
ineﬃciencies in contracting (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (2004)), we show that losses from
misallocation of talent can be substantial, even if contracting is perfect.
In addition to the above speciﬁc results, our paper makes two methodological contributions.
One is solving an assignment problem where ﬁrms diﬀer in the severity of moral hazard as well as
size. In existing assignment models (e.g. Sattinger (1993), Gabaix and Landier (2008), Terviö
(2008)), both ﬁrms and workers diﬀer in a single dimension (size and talent, respectively)
and thus can be unambiguously ranked.1 This allows for a relatively simple solution to the
assignment problem — positive assortative matching between the ranks. Assignment models are
typically complex to solve if one or both sides vary across multiple dimensions, because this
makes ranking diﬃcult. We show that risk and disutility can be combined with size into a
single dimension which we call “eﬀective” size, which we can use to unambiguously rank ﬁrms
and thus achieve a tractable solution to a multidimensional allocation problem.
A second methodological contribution is achieving a closed-form solution to a model in
which the agent aﬀects the volatility as well as mean of ﬁrm returns. Antecedents include
Sung (1995) and Ou-Yang (2003), who use the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) framework that
requires exponential utility, a ﬁnancial cost of eﬀort, continuous time and Gaussian noise, and
Dittmann and Yu (2009) who assume separable preferences and Gaussian noise. We allow for
general noise distributions and non-separable utility.
1In Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2009), workers (not ﬁrms) diﬀer on multiple characteristics; the model speciﬁes
that productivity is a weighted average of these characteristics, thus eﬀectively representing a single dimension.
Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) consider the allocation of workers to tasks, where both diﬀer along
a single dimension (skill and complexity, respectively). Kihlstrom and Laﬀont (1979) study the allocation of
agents to jobs (either worker or entrepreneur) according to a single dimension, risk aversion. Galichon and
Salanie (2009) do consider matching where both parties vary according to multiple dimensions, but require
utility to be transferable across the matching parties and are unable to obtain closed-form solutions.
5This paper is related to a number of models of executive compensation. Himmelberg and
Hubbard (2000) is an early attempt to jointly model pay and incentives, but the level of pay
is not an equilibrium and the absence of closed-form solutions renders drawing implications
diﬃcult. Gabaix and Landier (2008, “GL”) and Terviö (2008) present competitive assignment
models of the managerial labor market, absent an agency problem. Edmans, Gabaix and
Landier (2009), Axelson and Bond (2009), Baranchuk, Macdonald and Yang (2009) and Dicks
(2009) add moral hazard but assume risk-neutrality and thus cannot investigate the eﬀect of
risk, risk aversion or risk-taking. Adding risk-aversion is typically a non-trivial extension which
leads to very complex contracts. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) derive simple contracts under
the assumption of exponential utility, a ﬁnancial cost of eﬀort, Gaussian noise and continuous
time. As shown by Edmans et al., a multiplicative non-ﬁnancial cost of eﬀort is necessary to
generate realistic income eﬀects and empirically consistent scalings of incentives with ﬁrm size.
We thus use the modeling setup of Edmans and Gabaix (2009, “EG”) which yields closed-form
contracts without restrictions on the utility function or cost of eﬀort, while retaining the clarity
of discrete time. As a result, the equilibrium can be summarized by three closed-form equations.
By embedding the EG contracting framework in a market equilibrium, we obtain many new
results unattainable in either a partial equilibrium agency model, or a market equilibrium
framework under risk neutrality — such as the eﬀects of both cross-sectional and market-wide
changes in risk and disutility on CEO assignment and pay, and a calibration of the losses from
corporate governance imperfections. Tsuyuhara (2009) considers a market equilibrium with
risk aversion, where both ﬁrms and workers are ex ante homogeneous. Plehn-Dujowich and
Subrahmaniam (2009) allow for both heterogeneity and risk aversion, with output restricted
to two possible levels. Acharya, Gabarro and Volpin (2010) extend the standard assignment
model (where assignment depends only on ﬁrm size) to incorporate heterogeneity in corporate
governance and show the allocation depends on governance as well as size.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Incentive Pay in Partial Equilibrium
We commence with a one-period model featuring a single ﬁrm and a single CEO (also referred
to as the manager). This section is similar to EG; the main results come in Section 2.2 where
we extend the model to a market equilibrium with multiple ﬁrms and CEOs. Appendix A




where  represents baseline ﬁrm size and  ∈ [] is the CEO’s action (“eﬀort”). The action
 refers to any decision that improves the stock price but is costly to the manager, such as
6exerting eﬀort, forgoing private beneﬁts, or choosing not to consume perks. Since there is a
limit to the number of productive activities the agent can undertake to beneﬁt the principal,




 is the maximum productive eﬀort level. For example,  reﬂects zero stealing in a cash
ﬂow diversion model, taking all positive-NPV projects (while rejecting negative-NPV ones) in
a project selection model, or a limit to the number of hours a day the CEO can work while
remaining productive in an eﬀort model. Actions  do not beneﬁt the principal but
improve the stock price, such as manipulation. We allow for the maximum feasible action  to
exceed the maximum productive action  purely for technical reasons — when  is an interior
action, the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint to implement  becomes an equality, which
substantially simpliﬁes the proofs. (We conjecture that the results will continue to hold with
 = .) Shareholders maximize expected fundamental value net of CEO pay. Appendix A
proves that, if ﬁrm size  is suﬃciently high, maximum productive eﬀort  is optimal for the
ﬁrm because the beneﬁts of eﬀort (which are multiplicative in ) outweigh the costs (which are
multiplicative in the CEO’s wage).
The variable  is mean-zero noise with standard deviation  and bounded interval support.
The normalization by  [] in (1) and (2) ensures that expected ﬁrm value does not depend
on the noise distribution. The CEO privately observes  before choosing .E G s h o w t h a t
this assumption leads to closed-form contracts in discrete time, as well as consistency with the
optimal contract in continuous-time, where noise and actions are simultaneous.2 Note that the
CEO remains exposed to risk, since he does not observe  until after signing the contract — as
we will see, risk aﬀects virtually all of our results.
On the equilibrium path where  =  is exerted, the initial stock price is 0 = − [1],




=  +  +  (3)
with  =  −  − ln [].
2This timing assumption is also featured in models in which the agent sees total output before deciding how
much to divert (e.g. Lacker and Weinberg (1989), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), Biais et al. (2007)), or observes
t h e“ s t a t eo fn a t u r e ”b e f o r ec h o o s i n ge ﬀort (e.g. Harris and Raviv (1979), Sappington (1983), Baker (1992), and
Prendergast (2002)). As in most of these papers, to focus on a single source of imperfection (unobservability of
eﬀort) we abstract from commitment problems and assume that the CEO cannot quit after  is realized. Quits
can be prevented by raising the ﬁxed component of pay (see Appendix F of EG.)





for Γ 6=1 (4)
=l n − () for Γ =1 
 is the CEO’s monetary compensation. () captures the disutility of eﬀort and is increasing
and convex; in Section 2.2 we allow the cost function (·) to depend on the ﬁrm that the CEO
is working for, i.e. it is a ﬁrm rather than CEO characteristic.3 Γ ≥ 0 denotes relative risk
aversion. The CEO’s reservation utility is , which is exogenous in this section.
As in Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009), eﬀort has a multiplicative eﬀe c to nb o t hC E O
utility (equation (4))a n dﬁrm value (equation (2)). When eﬀort has a percentage eﬀect on ﬁrm
value, the dollar beneﬁts of working are higher for larger ﬁrms. Most CEO actions can be “rolled
out” across the entire ﬁrm and thus have a greater eﬀect in a larger company.4 Multiplicative
preferences consider private beneﬁts as a normal good, i.e. the utility they provide is increasing
in consumption. This is consistent with the treatment of most goods and services in consumer
theory; they are also commonly used in macroeconomics (see, e.g., Cooley and Prescott (1995)).
This speciﬁcation is also plausible under the literal interpretation of eﬀort as forgoing leisure:
a day of vacation is more valuable to a richer CEO as he has wealth to enjoy during it. Thus,
the CEO’s expenditure on leisure and private beneﬁts rises in proportion to his wealth — just as
with CRRA preferences, an investor’s allocation to risky assets rises in proportion to his wealth.
Indeed, it is multiplicative preferences which generate the CRRA utility function (4).5 Thus,
just as CRRA is typically favored over CARA in asset pricing and macroeconomics because it
leads to realistic income eﬀects, the same considerations motivate the use of a multiplicative
rather than ﬁnancial cost of eﬀort here. In addition, Edmans et al. show that multiplicative
preferences and production functions are necessary to deliver empirically consistent predictions
for the scaling of various incentive measures with ﬁrm size.
We take an optimal contracting approach that does not restrict the contract to speciﬁc
functional forms.6 The optimal contract is a general function () that implements  = ,
3More formally, the utility function is (−)
1−Γ
1−Γ ,w h e r e is the disutility that working in the ﬁrm imposes
on the CEO. Exerting eﬀort  in ﬁrm  entails disutility  =  (),w h e r e can be a function denoting the
cost of eﬀort from working in ﬁrm .
4See Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon (2009) for empirical evidence that CEOs have the same
percentage eﬀect on ﬁrm value, regardless of ﬁrm size.
5Consider the general utility function  ()=(1−Γ)(()−())
1−Γ . Our utility function (4) is a special case of this
with ()=l n (multiplicative preferences), which leads to CRRA. By contrast, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
assume that the cost of eﬀort is ﬁnancial, i.e. ()= and so the utility function becomes (1−Γ)(−())(1 − Γ),
which is CARA.
6Even though this is a hidden information model (the CEO learns  before choosing ), the optimal contract
does not involve messages, as proven in EG. Intuitively, the reason is that the ﬁrm wishes to implement  in all
cases. Hence, on the equilibrium path, there is a one to one correspondence between the ﬁrm’s return and the
noise, which makes messages redundant.
8satisﬁes the participation constraint  [] ≥ , and has the minimum cost  = [] to the
ﬁrm. From Theorem 1 of EG, the optimal contract is as follows:
Proposition 1 (CEO pay in partial equilibrium). The optimal contract pays the CEO an
amount  deﬁned by:
ln = Λ +  (5)
where Λ = 0 () and  is a constant that makes the participation constraint bind (
h¡




Proof The full proof is in EG; a heuristic proof is in Appendix A.
The contract in Proposition 1 has a simple form. It is attainable in closed form, and its
slope depends only on the cost of eﬀort Λ, but not on risk  nor risk aversion Γ —t h e s eo n l y
aﬀect the scalar . The sensitivity Λ represents the percentage change in pay  for a given
return . The contract can thus be implemented by giving the CEO Λ of stock and (1 − Λ)
of cash.7 When considering the contract in terms of the eﬀect of ﬁrm returns on dollar pay,
Λ reﬂects the convexity of the contract. Thus, changes in Λ aﬀect both the sensitivity of the
contract (in percent terms) and its convexity (in dollar terms).






























for  → 0. Γ(Λ22)2 is the risk premium required by a CEO receiving the contract in
Proposition 1, in the sense that Γ(Λ22)2=l n [] − ln−1 ( [ ()]) where  ()=(1−Γ)
1−Γ .
This interpretation motivates our notation Γ.
2.2 Incentive Pay in Market Equilibrium
The simplicity of the contract in Proposition 1 allows it to be embedded into a market equilib-
rium where the expected wage  is endogenously determined. We use the equilibrium model
of GL, which we summarize here. There is a continuum of ﬁrms of diﬀerent size and managers
with diﬀerent talent. Firm  ∈ [0] has size  () and CEO  ∈ [0] has talent  ().L o w
7Since  is a continuously compounded return, the contract must be rebalanced continuously so that the
percentage of stock remains constant at Λ.
9 denotes a larger ﬁrm and low  am o r et a l e n t e dC E O :0 ()  0, 0 ()  0.T h eC E O ’ s
talent increases ﬁrm value according to:
 =  + 
 (6)
where  parameterizes the size elasticity of the impact of talent and  the productivity of
talent, which we later allow to be heterogeneous across ﬁrms. Since talented CEOs are more
valuable in larger ﬁrms, the th most talented manager is matched with the th largest ﬁrm to
allow their talent to have greatest impact. The variable  considered in Section 2.1 thus refers
to ﬁrm size gross of talent and  refers to net size; going forward, unless otherwise stated, the
term “size” will refer to .
GL assume a Pareto ﬁrm size distribution  ()=−, and the following asymptotic value
for the spacings of the talent distribution: 0 ()=−−1. As in GL we consider the limit




where  () is the size of ﬁrm , ∗ is the index of a reference ﬁrm (e.g. the median ﬁrm in
the economy),  (∗) i st h es i z eo ft h a tr e f e r e n c eﬁrm, and (∗)=−∗0 (∗)( − ) is
a constant. CEOs at large ﬁr m se a r nm o r ea st h e ya r et h em o s tt a l e n t e d .
GL do not feature an agency problem and only specify the expected level of pay. We now
incorporate the incentive model of Section 2.1 to determine the sensitivity of pay. We index
the maximum eﬀort level by  to allow for heterogeneity in the level of eﬀort required. Firms
may also diﬀer in their cost of eﬀort,  () —f o re x a m p l e ,aﬁrm in a regulated industry
or headquartered in an unattractive location is unpleasant to work for regardless of the eﬀort
 exerted by the CEO. The marginal cost of eﬀo r ta tt h ei m p l e m e n t e de ﬀort level becomes
Λ = 0
 (). Risk may also vary and is indexed . We need not make any assumptions on
how these parameters vary with : since the contract implements  = ,f r o m( 2 ) ,g r o s sﬁrm
value remains at  as in the GL market equilibrium.













denotes the “equivalent variation” (“EV”) associated with ﬁrm , i.e. the loss suﬀered by the
manager from disutility (the  () term) and risk (the Γ(Λ2
2
)2 term). The latter arises
because the CEO has a fraction Λ of his pay invested in the ﬁrm, and ﬁrm returns have
10volatility . After adjusting for the EV, CEO ’s “eﬀective” wage is
 = 
− (9)







C E Oa s s i g n m e n t ,p a ya n di n c e n t i v e si nm a r k e te q u i l i b r i u ma r eg i v e nb e l o w :
Theorem 1 (CEO pay in market equilibrium). Let ∗ denote the index of a reference ﬁrm. In
equilibrium, the manager of rank  runs a ﬁrm whose “eﬀective size”
b  = 
− (11)











where  and  are deﬁn e db y( 8 )a n d( 1 0 ) ,(∗) is the size of the reference ﬁrm, and (∗)
is a constant independent of ﬁrm size. The actual pay  is given by:





Proof (Sketch). Assume that in market equilibrium, a CEO of talent  () receives an eﬀective
wage (adjusted for eﬀo r ta n dr i s k )o f ().I fﬁrm  wishes to hire manager ,i tm u s tp a y















  () − () (14)
Firm  behaves like a ﬁrm with “eﬀective” size (−)
1  (). Appendix A proves that it will
pay the eﬀective wage  = (∗)(−(∗))
¡
−
¢−. Taking into account the EV,
t h ed o l l a rw a g ei s = ,w h i c hy i e l d s( 1 2 ) ;( 1 3 )ﬂows directly from Proposition 1.
Theorem 1 shows that CEO assignment, pay and incentives in competitive market equilib-
rium can be summarized by three simple closed-form equations, (11)-(13). This tractability
allows for clear comparative statics. Starting with managerial assignment, in standard models,
ﬁrms and CEOs each vary along a single dimension (size and talent, respectively). This al-
lows for a relatively simple solution to the assignment problem — positive assortative matching,
11where the CEO with the highest attribute is matched to the ﬁrm with the highest attribute.
Assignment models are typically diﬃcult to solve where there is ﬁrm heterogeneity along multi-
ple dimensions, since it is unclear how to rank the ﬁrms and determine which is the “best” ﬁrm
to be matched with the most talented CEO. The above proof sketch shows that risk  and
the marginal cost of eﬀort Λ c a nb ec o m b i n e dw i t hs i z e into a single dimension, “eﬀective”
size −, which can be unambiguously ranked and determines the equilibrium matching.
In assignment models without moral hazard, more talented managers are assigned to larger
ﬁrms; this is eﬃcient because talent has a greater impact in a bigger ﬁrm. We show that
adding an agency problem distorts this eﬃcient allocation. A ﬁrm with a higher cost of eﬀort
must pay a greater salary as compensation. Given multiplicative preferences, exerting eﬀort
is particularly costly for talented, highly-paid CEOs. For example, a day of vacation yields
high utility to a rich CEO as he has income to spend during it. Therefore, the compensation
for disutility is proportional to the CEO’s wage. The required compensation for risk is also
proportional to the CEO’s wage. The incentive contract (13) pins down the fraction Λ of the
CEO’s salary that must be paid in stock. CEOs that are already wealthy are less motivated by
incentives, and thus must be given a greater dollar amount of stock to induce eﬀort. Therefore,
an increase in ﬁrm risk has a greater dollar eﬀect on the variability of their pay, and requires
the ﬁrm to pay them a higher dollar risk premium; indeed, Bandiera et al. (2010) ﬁnd that
managers with steeper contracts are paid more. Given CRRA, the required risk premium is a
percentage of the wage. In sum, both disutility and risk force a ﬁrm to increase the salary of any
manager that it hires by a given proportional amount, . Since this additional compensation
is proportional to the CEO’s salary, it is higher for more talented managers and so skilled
managers become relatively more expensive. Therefore, the ﬁrm chooses to hire a lower ability
manager. Acharya, Gabarro and Volpin (2010) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with weaker governance (i.e.
lower disutility) employ high-talent managers.
In sum, managerial talent is a double-edged sword. While a talented manager has the
potential toimproveﬁrm value to a greater degree, he is also more expensive to incentivize: since
he already commands a high salary, he is willing to forgo incentive pay to enjoy leisure. Indeed,
Malmendier and Tate (2009) ﬁnd that winning awards (which may lead to an upward revision
of the market’s perception of the CEO’s talent) leads to CEOs pursuing outside opportunities
such as writing books and assuming board seats. This incentive problem is particularly severe
if the ﬁrm involves high eﬀort or risk. Thus, start-ups in particular may prefer to hire a
“poor-and-hungry” CEO rather than a “rich-and-contented” alternative.8
Turning to expected pay, (12) shows that the wage depends not only on ﬁrm size  as
8Note that CEOs in our model have the same utility function, since it is not possible to solve an assignment
model tractably when both sides exhibit heterogeneity on multiple dimensions. Thus, it is not that a “poor-
and-hungry” CEO has a diﬀerent cost of eﬀort or risk aversion coeﬃcient. CEOs diﬀer only in their talent and
thus reservation wage. Owing to multiplicative preferences, diﬀerences in the reservation wage translate into
diﬀerences in the tendency to shirk, even though the utility function is not CEO-speciﬁc.
12in GL, but also on how the ﬁrm’s cost of eﬀort and risk () compare to other ﬁrms in the
economy (). Holding  constant, an increase in  augments the wage as compensation for risk
and disutility. Therefore, in the cross-section, ﬁrms with high EVs pay more. Indeed, Garen
(1994) ﬁnds empirically that CEOs of riskier ﬁrms command higher pay. However, it is only the
relative EV, ( − ), that matters. Thus, disutility and risk only matter in the cross-section
but not in the aggregate. If there was an economy-wide increase in risk or the disutility of
being a CEO (e.g. due to regulation or activist shareholders), which increases the EV of all
ﬁrms by the same absolute amount ,b o t h and  increase by ; ( − ) and thus wages
are unaﬀected — even though working for one’s present ﬁrm becomes less attractive, outside
options also become less attractive.9 Regarding the own-ﬁrm prediction, Peters and Wagner
(2009) investigate the link between CEO pay and the risk of ﬁring. A one percentage point
increase in ﬁring probability augments pay by 4-8% along the cross-section, but only 0.2-1.3%
over the time series. Peters (2009) studies the eﬀect on pay of all sources of risk (changes in
CEO wealth in addition to dismissal) and ﬁnds that it can explain the higher moments of the
cross-sectional pay distribution. Regarding the cross-ﬁrm prediction, Acharya, Gabarro and
Volpin (2010) ﬁnd that a ﬁrm pays higher salaries if its competitors are worse governed (and
thus more attractive to work for). More generally, the dependence of pay on the aggregate
variable  highlights the importance of controlling for economy-wide variables such as average
risk (or at least time trends) in empirical analyses of the determinants of pay.
The eﬀect of changes in ( − ) on expected pay is scaled by .Ah i g h e r raises the
dispersion of ﬁrm sizes, and a higher  augments the size elasticity of talent.10 Both factors
increase the importance of size for CEO assignment and pay, and mean that variations in  are
relatively unimportant — as can be seen in (11), the eﬀect of  on “eﬀective” size is decreasing
in . Hence  and  appear in the denominator of (12). By contrast, a higher  raises the
dispersion of CEO talent. When talent is more variable, ﬁrms are more willing to pay the
required compensation to attract a talented CEO (rather than “trading down” to the next best
CEO), and so ( − ) has a higher eﬀect on the wage.
Moving to the strength of incentives, (13) shows that this depends only on Λ, the cost of
eﬀort, and is independent of risk and risk aversion. Hence, the Theorem shows which parameters
do and do not matter for the diﬀerent components of the contract. The cost of eﬀort aﬀects
the strength of incentives, and increases the level of pay in the cross-section but not in the
aggregate. Risk and risk aversion also augment the level of pay in the cross-section, but not
in the aggregate. However, they have no eﬀect on the strength of incentives. The familiar
9This prediction assumes that a CEO’s only outside option is to become a CEO of another ﬁrm. If CEOs
can ﬁnd a job outside of the CEO market, the more general prediction is that the cross-sectional elasticity of
the wage to eﬀort and risk is higher than the market-wide elasticity. See Section 3.2 for an extension to jobs
outside the CEO market.
10In more mathematical terms, it is  that matters for assignment, given equation (6). In turn,  ()=
−:  has a Pareto distribution with exponent 1(). The higher  is, the more dispersed the distrib-
ution of elasticity-adjusted sizes .
13trade-oﬀ between incentives and risk, which applies to rank-and-ﬁle employees, may not apply
to CEOs. Since CEOs impact the entire ﬁrm, if the ﬁrm is suﬃciently large, the beneﬁts of
eﬀort are suﬃciently strong that the ﬁrm implements maximum eﬀort regardless of risk or risk
aversion.
Overall, in assignment models without moral hazard, there is a positive correlation between
managerial talent, ﬁrm size, and CEO pay.11 In the presence of an agency problem and risk
aversion, this relationship is mediated by other factors — a ﬁrm that is involves high risk or
disutility chooses to hire a less talented CEO, and pays a higher wage than his talent merits as
compensation. Indeed, Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) ﬁnd that, while there is generally a positive
correlation between managerial ability and salary, a signiﬁcant number of low-ability managers
are well paid.
Theorem 1 can be extended to allow for ﬁrm heterogeneity not only in total disutility  and
risk , but also the impact of CEO talent. This extension is given in the following Remark.
Remark 1 (Heterogeneous talent impact). Let the eﬀe c to ft a l e n to nﬁrm value (6) be given
by:
 =  + 

 (15)
where  parameterizes the productivity of talent in ﬁrm . In equilibrium, the manager of
rank  runs a ﬁrm whose “eﬀective size”





A ﬁrm with high  particularly beneﬁts from a talented manager and thus has a higher
eﬀective size. For example, ﬁr m sw i t hh i g hg r o w t ho p p o r t u n i t i e so ri na nu n r e g u l a t e di n d u s t r y
have signiﬁcant scope for a talented manager to add value. Since growing ﬁrms are also likely
to be risky, and risk reduces the talent of the CEO hired from Theorem 1), empirical testing of
this prediction will have to control for risk. Note also that talent impact  is a quite diﬀerent
concept from disutility  (),a n ds ot h ed i ﬀerential eﬀects of these variables on the talent
of the CEO hired are mutually consistent.  () reﬂects the total disutility the CEO must
suﬀer when working for the ﬁrm, e.g. from regulation, being headquartered in an unfavorable
location, or having to exert eﬀort or forgo vacation days. These are inconveniences that are
not mitigated by talent; in fact, they are particularly severe for talented managers owing to
multiplicative preferences. By contrast,  reﬂects the impact that a talented CEO has on ﬁrm
v a l u ei fh ee x e r t sm a x i m u me ﬀort — recall that gross ﬁrm value  only becomes (15) if  = ,
11Bandiera et al. (2010) ﬁnd that more talented managers work for larger ﬁrms, and Chang et al. (2010) ﬁnd
that more talented managers are better-paid.
14so it is  not  that parameterizes the maximum potential value.12 Thus,  reﬂects the
potential for the manager to add value through exploiting growth opportunities, innovating or
changing strategy. In sum, Remark 1 predicts that talented managers will be hired by ﬁrms
with high growth potential, low risk and low disutility.
One might also think that talent might aﬀect the CEO’s productivity of eﬀort, in addition
to its eﬀect on maximum ﬁrm value as measured by . Unfortunately, it is very diﬃcult to solve
tractably an assignment model in which both sides diﬀer along multiple dimensions; while we are
able to go beyond prior literature by allowing for ﬁrm heterogeneity across multiple dimensions,
CEOs can only diﬀer along a single dimension (the parameter ) and so we cannot introduce a
separate manager-speciﬁc parameter for the productivity of eﬀort. However, note that  already
captures the productivity of eﬀort to a degree: since 1 =(  + 
)min()+− [],
the marginal eﬀect of increasing  on ﬁrm value is increasing in . Hence, our single source
of manager heterogeneity does incorporate the realistic notion that a given level of eﬀort by
a talented manager is more productive — although exerting a given eﬀort level is costlier to a
talented manager owing to multiplicative preferences.13
We conclude this section by highlighting the features in the model that generate our re-
sults. First, the positive qualitative r e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h eC E O ’ sw a g ea n dt h er e q u i r e d
compensation for disutility and risk, and thus distortions in allocation, can be generated by
other utility functions and do not require multiplicative preferences. (See Appendix A for a
proof.) Multiplicative preferences are only necessary to deliver the quantitative result that,
as the CEO’s wage rises, his dollar stock holdings must increase in direct proportion. Thus,
if Λ is constant across ﬁrms, the fraction of pay that is in stock is independent across ﬁrms
of diﬀerent size, as found empirically by Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Murphy (1999).
This empirical consistency is not a new result — Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009) already
showed that multiplicative preferences are necessary to generate the size-independence of the
stock fraction (albeit in a risk-neutral model) — instead, it provides the justiﬁcation for using
multiplicative preferences here. In turn, the direct proportionality (that results from multiplica-
t i v ep r e f e r e n c e sa sw e l la sC R R A )l e a d st os u b s t a n t i a lt r a c t a b i l i t y ,a si tm e a n st h a tm a n yk e y
variables scale with CEO pay. In particular, the required compensation for risk and disutility
is proportional to the wage, so the eﬀective wage is proportional to the actual wage. This is
critical for the derivation of the “eﬀective” size variable b  that allows a tractable solution to
a multidimensional allocation problem (see the proof sketch of Theorem 1.)
Second, in standard models, the optimal eﬀort level for the ﬁrm is a trade-oﬀ between the
12From equation (2), we have  [1]=min()− and so  denotes the range of actions the CEO can take
to destroy ﬁrm value (compared to the maximum eﬀort benchmark) rather than create value. For example, 
is high in ﬁrms with free cash ﬂow problems or weak governance.
13Even though eﬀort has a higher dollar productivity for a talented manager, its percent productivity (i.e.
the eﬀect of eﬀort on ﬁrm returns) is independent of talent, and so the incentive contract (13) is independent
of . Intuitively, since the market already knows that the manager is talented, the ﬁrm’s stock price is already
high — thus, to increase the stock return, he has to work just as hard as an untalented manager.
15costs (disutility plus the risk imposed by incentives) and beneﬁts of eﬀort, and is typically very
diﬃcult to solve (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1983)). Since CEOs can aﬀect the entire ﬁrm
value, the beneﬁts of eﬀort outweigh the costs and so the ﬁrm always implements maximum
eﬀort. This removes the need to analyze small trade-oﬀs and leads to a simple optimal contract.
Third, the CEO observes the noise before taking his action. As shown in the heuristic proof
and in EG, this leads to simple contracts such as (5). The intuition is that, since the CEO
has observed  when taking his action, the IC condition ((33) in Appendix A) must hold state-
by-state, i.e. for every possible realization of . This tightly constrains the set of contracts
available to the principal. If  was realized after , the IC condition would only need to hold
on average. Many contracts would satisfy the IC condition, and the problem becomes complex
as the principal must solve for the cheapest contract out of this continuum.
2.3 Eﬃciency Analysis
2.3.1 Losses From Moral Hazard Under Optimal Contracting
I nap u r ea s s i g n m e n tm o d e l ,t h ee ﬃcient allocation involves positive assortative matching be-
tween talent and size. With an eﬀort decision, the ﬁrst-best allocation (that would occur if
eﬀort was observable) now involves assigning CEOs to ﬁrms based on their size and disutility.
It may be eﬃcient for a talented CEO not to work for a large ﬁrm if it involves high disu-
tility, because working is particularly painful for wealthy CEOs. If all CEOs are risk-neutral,
then “eﬀective size” becomes −() and is based on size and disutility alone, and so the
market equilibrium allocation is ﬁrst-best eﬃcient, just as in the risk-neutral model of Edmans
et al. (2009). Thus, the addition of an eﬀort decision without risk aversion does not lead to
distortions — analogously, in a standard eﬀort model, the ﬁrst-best can be achieved if the agent
is risk-neutral and does not face limited liability.
However, when risk aversion is added, the market allocation now depends on risk aversion
as well as size and disutility, and is second-best. Large ﬁrms that would beneﬁth i g h l yf r o m
a talented CEO nevertheless choose to hire a lower-ability CEO if they are risky. Thus, risk
aversion leads to two sources of ineﬃciency. The ﬁrst is ineﬃcient risk-sharing between ﬁrms
a n dC E O s ,w h i c ha l s oe x i s t si nas i n g l e - ﬁrm moral hazard model and does not aﬀect production.
The second, which is speciﬁc to a market equilibrium, is distortions in talent assignment that
aﬀect real productive activity.14
We now derive closed-form expressions for both sources of ineﬃciency to analyze the cost
of the moral hazard problem, even when it is fully solved by contracts. If corporate governance
were perfect, boards would monitor the manager’s actions directly, achieving ﬁrst-best. Given
imperfect monitoring, moral hazard must be addressed with incentive pay. Even if such con-
tracts are set optimally, the above ineﬃciencies remain. Direct monitoring and incentives are
14In the general equilibrium of Kihlstrom and Laﬀont (1979), risk aversion also leads to ineﬃcient production.
16sometimes seen as substitute governance mechanisms; however the former is more eﬃcient as it
does not lead to distortions. While recent criticism of corporate governance has centered around
ineﬃciencies in pay-setting (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried (2004)), the losses from misallocation of
talent, even if contracting is optimal, can be signiﬁcant.
Since ineﬃciency stems solely from risk, not disutility, for simplicity we set  ()=0∀ .
T h eE Vt h u sb e c o m e s0
 = Γ(Λ2
2




denote the total salary received by CEOs, and normalize the wage of the least talented manager,
(),t o0 . S i n c eaw a g eo f i sw o r t ha n“ e ﬀective” wage of −0









If b  () denotes the talent of the CEO assigned to ﬁrm  under the second-best allocation, the
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The losses are given in the following Proposition.




















For small distortions, these expressions become:








Proof See Appendix A.
Both sources of ineﬃciency are proportional to , the total wage bill. This is intuitive: the
economic importance of a distortion to a factor of production is proportional to its marginal
product; for a worker this is measured by his wage. From (19), the approximate loss due to
ineﬃcient risk-sharing depends on the mean of 0
, since this aﬀects the amount of risk the
17average CEO has to bear. By contrast, from (20), the approximate loss due to misallocation is
proportional to the variance of 0
.I f0
 = 0, the rankings of eﬀective size −0
 coincide
exactly with the rankings of size  and there is no distortion. It is relative diﬀerences in 0

which cause the rankings to diﬀer and the assignment to be aﬀected. In Theorem 1 we showed
that, if disutility rose across all ﬁrms by the same additive amount ,t h e r ei sn oe ﬀect on the
equilibrium. Here, we can see that a proportional change does have an impact: if the marginal
cost of eﬀort Λ expands by the same ratio across all ﬁrms, (0
) and thus  increases.
A given proportional increase in disutility equates to a greater absolute increase for a ﬁrm with
high disutility to begin with. This in turn requires the ﬁrm to pay a particularly high dollar
premium to talented managers, and causes it to choose a less skilled CEO. One example of such
a change is a proportional tax, such as the UK’s tax on 2009 banker bonuses. By contrast, a
lump-sum tax would have no eﬀect.
Holding  constant, ,  and  h a v et h es a m ee ﬀects on allocational eﬃciency  as
they do for the dispersion of wages in (12). The intuition is similar: when  and  are high,
distortions due to diﬀerences in 0
 have a small eﬀect. The ranking of eﬀective size is similar
to the ranking of unadjusted size and so assignment is little aﬀected. By contrast, a higher 
means that talent is more dispersed, and so the losses from misallocation of talent are greater.
Section 3.3 calibrates the magnitude of these losses. Note that we can already draw some
conclusions from the analytical expressions in Proposition 2: the ineﬃciencies will be moderate
as they are proportional to the total wage bill  rather than ﬁrm size. This is because ﬁrms
contract eﬃciently and hire CEOs optimally, given the need to pay a premium for risk and
disutility. Indeed, the allocation is second-best eﬃcient: given the existence of a moral hazard
problem (the unobservability of eﬀort), a social planner with the same information as ﬁrms
could not improve on the outcome. A formal proof is in Appendix A; a heuristic argument is
that the eﬃcient contract is the one in Proposition 1; given that this is oﬀered, the competitive
matching is eﬃcient.
2.3.2 Losses From Random Assignment
For comparison with the above moderate losses, we now conduct the following thought exper-
iment.15 Assume that poor corporate governance instead manifests in CEOs being randomly
allocated, rather than a second-best optimal assignment. Each ﬁrm in the top  by size hires
a CEO at random from the top  CEOs by talent, where  ≥ 1 is a parameter we discuss








15Llense (2009) studies the eﬃcency losses from another thought experiment, the imposition of a pay cap, in
a pure assignment model without moral hazard.
18where  = 1

R 
0  () denotes the mean talent.
Proposition 3 If   1, the losses from a random allocation of CEOs are inﬁnite,  =
+∞.I f  1
 =
∙
1 −  + 












Proof See Appendix A.
Equation (20) showed that losses due to misallocation of talent resulting from moral hazard
are decreasing in  and  (holding  constant). By contrast, the losses due to random assign-
ment are increasing in  and . In Proposition 2, assignment is second-best optimal. Thus,
when eﬀective ﬁrm size is more dispersed ( and  are higher), variation in  has a relatively
small eﬀect on the rankings of eﬀective ﬁrm size and we remain close to positive assortative
matching. The losses from second-best matching are thus lower. In Proposition 3, assignment
is random. Thus, when eﬀective ﬁrm size is more dispersed, the losses from random matching
are higher. Since talent has a multiplicative eﬀect on scaled ﬁrm size  (equation (6)), the
cost of random assignment of talent is a function of scaled ﬁrm size. When   1,t h i sm e a n
ﬁrm size  [] is inﬁnite and so losses are inﬁnite.
There are two natural choices for .O n ei s =1 ,i . e .t h et o p ﬁrms randomly choose
from the top  CEOs, in which case the losses are given by (22). However, this is not an equal
comparison with the losses from second-best assignment given in Proposition 2. With  =1 ,
all ﬁrms are guaranteed a CEO in the top . By contrast, in the allocation of Proposition 2,
a ﬁrm of size rank  hires a CEO of talent rank −. Therefore, the worst manager that
can be hired has rank ,w h e r e
 =s u p
−.( 2 3 )
Thus, a second natural choice for  in Proposition 3 is given by (23), in which case the worst
manager that can be hired also has rank  sup−, just as in Proposition 2. With this choice
of , the losses under random and second-best allocation can be directly compared. Since
1 
1−+

















1 −  + 







Thus,  ≤  as is intuitive: second-best matching is superior to random matching.
The diﬀerence is increasing in  and , as these variables raise the dispersion of eﬀective ﬁrm
19size and thus importance of second-best matching.
3E x t e n s i o n s
3.1 Providing Risk-Taking Incentives
3.1.1 General Theorem
In the core model, the CEO can improve the mean return  without changing risk, which is
exogenous at . In reality, increasing ﬁrm value may require taking on risky, positive-NPV
projects — indeed, many commentators argue that a major goal of incentive compensation is
to induce managers to take actions that improve ﬁrm value even if they augment risk (see,
e.g., Core, Guay and Larcker (2003)). In this section, we endogenize  so that it depends on
the mean return chosen by the CEO. In a standard model with eﬀort and risk-taking where
noise follows the action (e.g. Dittmann and Yu (2009)), the above choice can be modeled by
allowing the CEO to choose a single action ,w h i c ha ﬀects both the mean and volatility of the
return. Since the action aﬀects the distribution of the noise, the noise must follow the action.
However, the framework we use to achieve tractability requires no noise to follow the CEO’s
ﬁnal action, so that the IC constraints hold state-by-state. We therefore operationalize the
CEO’s risk choice by extending the model to two periods, so that there are two actions and
a single noise in between. The ﬁrst-period action 1 aﬀects both the mean of the ﬁrst-period
signal 1 and the volatility of the second-period signal 2. (In this subsection, subscripts index
time periods rather than the rank of a ﬁrm or CEO.) The second-period action 2 aﬀects the
mean of 2 only, since there is no noise to follow this action. As with earlier, the principal
implements  in each period. The full timing is as follows:
1. Noise 1 is privately observed by the CEO.
2. The CEO chooses 1
3. The signal 1 = 1 + 1 is publicly observed.
4. Noise 2 is privately observed by the CEO.
5. The CEO chooses 2
6. The signal 2 = 2 + (1)2 + (1)is publicly observed.
We have 0 (1) ≥ 0, so that actions to improve ﬁrm value also entail augmenting risk (e.g.
taking on risky, positive-NPV projects). To ensure that  [2 | 1] is independent of 1 (so






20To our knowledge, the contracting problem where the agent aﬀects the volatility as well as
the mean has only been solved in speciﬁc cases. Sung (1995) and Ou-Yang (2003) study the
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) case of exponential utility, a ﬁnancial cost of eﬀort, continuous
time and Gaussian noise, and Dittmann and Yu (2009) consider separable preferences and
Gaussian noise in a one-period model.16 Therefore, before specializing to the utility function
(4) used in this paper, we ﬁrst derive the result for the more general utility function:
 (1 2)=[(() − 1 (1) − 2 (2))] (25)
where ()=(1−Γ)(1 − Γ) for Γ 6=1and ()= for Γ =1 . The only assumption we
make on  is that it is increasing and weakly concave. The utility function (4) corresponds to
()=l n and a single action.
Theorem 2 (Optimal contract, endogenous risk). The optimal contract pays the CEO an
amount  deﬁned by:
(1 2)=











1= if Γ 6=1
0





and  is a constant that makes the CEO’s participation constraint bind.
For the particular case where 2 is Gaussian, or the limit of small noises, then 0 ()=









Proof See Appendix A.
3.1.2 Application to CRRA Preferences
The utility function (4) corresponds to ()=l n. Applying Theorem 2 to this case yields the
following result.
Proposition 4 (CEO pay in partial equilibrium, endogenous risk). The optimal contract pays
the CEO an amount  deﬁned by:
ln = Λ11 + Λ22 + 
16Lambert (1986) considers a model in which the agent takes separate eﬀort and volatility decisions, in a
model where output is restricted to three possible levels.
21where Λ1 and Λ2 are given by (27) and (28). On the equilibrium path this can be rewritten:
ln =  + 
where  is a constant that makes the CEO’s participation constraint bind, and
 = Λ11 + Λ2()2 (30)
is the total noise to which the contract exposes the agent.
The market equilibrium allocation and wage are given by equations (11) and (13) in Theorem
1, with the EV now deﬁned by




where  indexes ﬁrm ’s risk and cost of eﬀort,  = Λ11 + Λ2()2,a n dw ed e ﬁne












EG show that, under exogenous risk, Λ1 = 0
1 () and Λ2 = 0
2 (). We compare this with
our slope under endogenous risk with small or Gaussian noises, equation (29). The core case
is Γ ≥ 1. Λ1 is higher when the CEO aﬀects ﬁrm risk, since the contract must now induce not
only eﬀort but also risk-taking. A risk-averse CEO may forgo risky, positive-NPV projects. To
induce him to accept such a project, it is necessary to give him a more convex payout so that
he beneﬁts from risk. Since the strength of incentives Λ1 also represents the convexity of dollar
pay to ﬁrm value, this increased convexity is achieved by raising Λ1.
The strength of incentives Λ1 is increasing in four parameters. First, it is increasing in risk
aversion Γ: the more risk-averse the CEO, the greater the convexity needed to overcome his risk
aversion. For similar reasons, it is increasing in () (the level of ﬁrm risk) and Λ2 (the CEO’s
exposure to the risk induced by 1.) The positive relationship between incentives and risk ()
contrasts the negative association predicted by standard models, which assume exogenous risk
and posit a trade-oﬀ between incentives and risk-sharing, but is consistent with the empirical
ﬁndings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Core and Guay (1999) and Oyer and Schaefer (2004).
Finally, Λ1 rises in the marginal increase in risk caused by implementing all positive-NPV
projects 0 (). The intuition is similar: the greater the additional risk imposed by a positive-
NPV project, the greater the convexity the CEO must be given to induce him to take it. If
the main way in which the CEO aﬀects ﬁrm value is by not diverting cash ﬂows, there is no
link between risk and return and so 0 ()=0and Λ1 = 0
1 (). By contrast, if the key CEO
action is the choice of risky projects, 0 ()  0 and Λ1 increases. 0 () is likely to be high in
22new economy ﬁrms since they have little tangible capital and so enhancing ﬁrm value involves
greater risk — investing in R&D has a zero payoﬀ if the R&D fails, whereas investing in an old
economy plant generates liquidation value upon failure. Indeed, incentives are stronger in new
economy ﬁrms (Ittner, Lambert and Larcker (2003), Murphy (2003)) and have risen over time
(Jensen and Murphy (2004)).











which is lower than 0
1 () if and only if Λ2  1. A risk-neutral CEO only cares about the
expected value of his compensation. If Λ2  1, then his compensation is a convex function of
the ﬁrm’s market value17, and thus he has incentives to take excessive risk, i.e. choose an 1
above the maximum productive level .Al o w e rΛ1 oﬀsets this tendency and induces the CEO
to reduce 1 to the optimal level. In sum, our results contrast the argument (often made by
critics of executive pay) that powerful incentives induce the CEO to take excessive risk, and
thus if the CEO is able to aﬀect risk as well as the average return, incentives should be weaker.
For the core case of Γ ≥ 1, incentives are unambiguously stronger; only if Γ is suﬃciently low
and Λ2 is suﬃciently high will incentives be shallower.
We note two additional points. First, even if 1 ()=0∀  (i.e. the risk-increasing action is
costless to the CEO), Λ1 is typically non-zero — incentives are necessary not because the eﬃcient
action requires the CEO to exert eﬀort, but because it exposes him to risk. This is consistent
with the idea mentioned at the start of this section, that incentives are used to induce risk-
taking, rather than solely to induce eﬀort. Second, since 1 aﬀects 2 (= 2+(1)2+(1)), it
may seem that Λ2 could be used to control the CEO’s choice of 1.H o w e v e r ,Λ2 is unchanged at
0
2 (). This is because the time-2 IC condition must hold state-by-state, i.e. for every possible
realization of 2. In turn, this forces the slope of the contract (i.e. beneﬁts from eﬀort) to
equal the marginal cost of eﬀort, 0
2 (). This is a similar intuition to the contract’s tractability,
described at the end of Section 2.2 — since the IC conditions must hold state-by-state, the
principal has little freedom in designing the contract.
3.2 Outside Options
The core model considered a single labor market (CEOs) in ﬁxed supply. In reality, CEOs may
be able to ﬁnd jobs outside the CEO market, and ﬁrms may hire managers currently employed
in other sectors. We thus extend the model to allow for an elastic supply of talent. To do so in a
tractable way, we assume the existence of an integrated market between the “corporate sector”
and the “non-corporate sector.” The former represents the CEO labor market, and the latter
17The dollar pay received by the CEO as a result of second-period performance is Λ22. Substituting 2 =
ln(21) gives (21)
Λ2, which is convex in 2 if and only if Λ2  1.
23represents alternative jobs, such as hedge funds, entrepreneurship or consulting. We assume
that ﬁrms in both sectors initially have identical characteristics, and that the fraction of ﬁrms
in the corporate and non-corporate sectors are respectively 1 −  and . The probability that
a ﬁrm is in the corporate sector is drawn independently from the distribution of ﬁrm sizes.
Theorem 1 showed that, if the disutility of being a CEO at any ﬁrm rises from  () to
 ()+, the level of pay is unchanged — while working for one’s own ﬁrm becomes less
unattractive, the outside option of being a CEO at another ﬁrm also becomes undesirable.
We revisit this prediction in the case where the CEO has an additional outside option, the
non-corporate sector, in which disutility is unchanged.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the disutility of working in the corporate sector rises from  ()
to  ()+ for a small .T h e n :
(i) Log pay in the corporate sector increases by








, i.e. the sector hires less talented workers.
(iii) The total loss of value creation (aggregate ﬁrm value gross of wages) by the corporate
sector is  
,w h e r e is the initial amount paid to CEOs in the corporate sector.
Proof See Appendix A.
Part (i) of Proposition 5 shows that the log wage increases by

. The intuition behind
the eﬀect of ,  and  i st h es a m ea sf o rt h e i re ﬀect on the pay equation (12), discussed earlier:
when  and  are large,  has a small eﬀect on the distribution of scaled size ;w h e n is
high, ﬁrms are more willing to pay to retain talent. Part (ii) shows that a corporate ﬁrm hires
a less talented manager. The intuition is similar to the distortion to CEO assignment caused
by moral hazard, discussed in Theorem 1. Since corporate ﬁrms must pay a premium for the
increased disutility of being a CEO, and the premium is multiplicative in the wage and thus
greater for more talented workers, corporate ﬁrms hire less skilled agents. The intuition behind
the eﬀect of  and  i st h es a m ea si ne q u a t i o n( 1 2 ) ;t h ed i s p e r s i o no ft a l e n t has no eﬀect
since part (ii) refers to the talent rank of a manager. Part (iii) shows that the total loss in
value created by the corporate sector is increasing in the aggregate pay of corporate CEOs ,
for the same reason as in Proposition 2.
All three outcomes are increasing in , the size of the non-corporate sector, as this represents
the outside option. When outside options are larger, a higher wage premium is required to keep
a CEO within the corporate sector (part (i)). (When the corporate sector is the entire economy
( =0 ), pay does not change, since CEOs have no outside option; this is the result from
Theorem 1.) This greater premium in turn leads to greater distortions in CEO assignment
(part (ii)) and consequently more value loss (part (iii)).
Note that a sector may be deﬁned as a speciﬁc industry within the corporate sector, rather
than the CEO market as a whole. This interpretation allows us to study the eﬀect of industry-
speciﬁc trends. For example, the two “sectors” could be the ﬁnancial industry and all other jobs
24that a ﬁnancial CEO could take. The recent ﬁnancial crisis has led to increased regulation of the
ﬁnancial industry in particular, with little changes in the other industries. As warned by some
commentators, this may lead talented CEOs to leave the ﬁnancial industry. The magnitude
of the value loss is increasing in the extent of ﬁnancial CEOs’ outside options, and so may be
particularly large because ﬁnancial CEOs often have the option of not only becoming the CEO
of a non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm, but also moving to a hedge fund or private equity ﬁrm.
3.3 A Calibration
We now undertake an approximate calibration of the eﬃciency losses in Section 2.3. We start
with the losses from second-best assignment under moral hazard, given in Proposition 2. As in
GL, we take  =  =1and  =2 3 a n dc o n s i d e rt h et o p5 0 0ﬁrms in Execucomp by aggregate
value. For 2006, aggregate ﬂow compensation (“tdc1” in Execucomp, winsorizing at the 5th
and 95th percentiles) is  =$ 5billion.
We start with the estimation of , given by equation (18). The key challenge is to
estimate 0
−0. This depends on the marginal cost of eﬀort, which is inherently unobservable
and we are unable of any previous studies that estimate it. However, a key advantage of our
unifying framework is that we can infer 0
 − 0 by using the wage equation (12). Taking logs
of this equation and rearranging yields
 =l n − ( − )ln
where  =  +













by deﬁnition of ,s o− = 
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in equation (18). This yields an estimate
of  as $7.4 billion. We note two potential issues with our approach. The ﬁrst is that
equation (18) contains 0










2 , so we are implicitly assuming that  () i st h es a m ea c r o s sﬁrms. Empirically,
cross-sectional variation in  from the average  may stem from variation in  (),b u t
the above approach attributes it entirely to diﬀerences in 0
.S i n c e  is increasing in
t h ev a r i a n c eo f0
, this has the potential to overstate . One goal of the calibration is to
highlight that the losses from random assignment in Proposition 3 are signiﬁcantly greater than
those from second-best assignment in Proposition 2. Thus, by providing an upper bound on
25, this approach works against us by underestimating the diﬀerences in losses.
The second caveat is that  may be slightly mis-measured in practice - even though ﬁrm
size and the CEO’s wage are observable, it may be that the CEO’s actual wage diﬀers from
his market wage, e.g. if he is given deferred compensation. Again, measurement errors will
overstate ; moreover, we can estimate the likely magnitude of the resulting bias. Let
∗
 denote the true value and  the observed value, and assume the classic errors-in-variables
structure  = ∗
 +  where ∗






















Using the notation Φ()= []
£
−¤, the decomposition can be rewritten:
Φ()=Φ(
∗)Φ()
The measured Φ() overstates Φ(∗) by a factor Φ(), which exceeds 1 by Jensen’s inequality.















If the measurement error is moderate, e.g.  =0 2, the bias is 
5
4022 =1 05, i.e. only 5%.
Indeed, replacing  by a three-year average has little eﬀect on the results.
We now turn to ,g i v e nb y( 1 7 ) . T h i sr e q u i r e sa ne s t i m a t eo f0
 alone, rather than
0
 − 0, and so we cannot use the above method. We thus infer the marginal cost of eﬀort
from observed contracts, under the assumption that ﬁrms are contracting eﬃciently. In our
one-period model, where incentives stem only from newly-granted stock and options, Λ equals
the percentage change in pay for a percentage point return. In reality, the bulk of a CEO’s
incentives stems from previously granted stock and options (see, e.g., Hall and Liebman (1998),
Core, Guay, and Verrecchia (2003)). Hence, Edmans, Gabaix and Landier’s (2009) measure of
incentives is the dollar change in wealth for a one percentage point return, scaled by annual pay,
which they call .18 While  measures the sensitivity of CEO wealth to the current period
return, the CEO bears risk from changes in the stock price during his entire tenure as CEO.
To convert  into an estimate of Λ, we assume the CEO works for  years and consumes only





18This dataset is available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~aedmans/data.html.The data con-
struction is described in Appendix B of Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009).
26Thus, (ln)=Λ22,a n d0 =
Γ(Λ22)









where  =WealthWage, and since Λ =( WealthWealth) in a multi-period model.
To estimate the CEO’s wealth, we start by taking data from Dittmann and Maug (2007),
who estimate the CEO’s non-ﬁrm wealth which results from past salary and bonus awards,
and sales of stock and options previously granted by the ﬁrm.19 We then add the CEO’s
current wealth invested in the ﬁrm, from stock and options, to give a total wealth measure.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain data on the wealth of U.S. CEOs that does not
stem from past or current executive compensation (e.g. real estate ownership or holdings of
other securities), but this is a reasonable benchmark. CEOs in 2006 have been in their current
position for a median of 5.6 years. This is an estimate of 2 (since most CEOs will continue
in oﬃce after 2006) and so it corresponds to  =1 1 2. Taking the benchmark case of log utility
(Γ =1 ) and using the exact expression (17) yields  =0 34 =$ 1 7 billion. Note that
this method is not suitable for estimation of :s i n c e0
 enters with a positive exponent,
 would be extremely sensitive to outliers in 0
. Indeed, 0
 exhibits signiﬁcant outliers,
due to outliers in volatility, wages, or stock and option holdings. The estimation of  is much
less aﬀected since 0
 enters with a negative exponent.20 In sum, the preliminary calibration
suggests total eﬃciency losses from imperfect monitoring (while retaining optimal contracting)
of approximately $9 billion, twice the aggregate CEO salary.
We now turn to the losses from random allocation, given in Proposition 3. We focus on the
case of  =1since this does not require estimation of the ’s. Since this means that each
ﬁrm is guaranteed to end up with a top-500 CEO, our results will represent a lower bound. To
estimate 1








|  ≥ ∗
¸
 (32)




























19This dataset is available at http://people.few.eur.nl/dittmann/data.htm. We thank Ingolf Dittmann
for generously making this data available.
20In addition, as with any calibration, we assume real-world data is optimal and thus can be used to estimate
Λ. If, however, governance failures manifest in suboptimal contracting, our measure of Λ is inaccurate.
21Our calibration uses Zipf’s law and constant returns to scale ( =  =1 ).  in (22) is thus on the cusp
of being divergent (with a weak, logarithmic divergence), and so it is easier to estimate with (32).





|  ≥ ∗
i
can be estimated as the mean ﬁrm size above a
cutoﬀ ∗, divided by ∗.W ed e ﬁne ∗ a st h es i z eo ft h em e d i a nﬁrm in our top 500 (the 250th
largest ﬁrm), which yields 5.3. From (22) we have  ∼ 53(53) = 32 ∼ $16 billion.
This is markedly greater than the combined losses from second-best assignment in Proposition
2. Moreover, since our estimate of  is a lower bound (it assumes  =1 )a n dt h ee s t i m a t e
of  is an upper bound, the true diﬀerence is likely to be signiﬁcantly greater. Naturally,
the losses from both imperfect monitoring and random allocation will be signiﬁcantly higher if
we consider all top executives, rather than just the CEO.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies how CEO assignment, pay and incentives depend on talent, talent impact,
ﬁrm size, risk and disutility in market equilibrium. The model’s closed-form solutions allow
the determinants of these three outcomes to be transparent, and clear empirical predictions. In
talent assignment models without an eﬀort conﬂict, the most talented managers are assigned
to the largest ﬁrms. We show that this eﬃcient allocation is distorted in the presence of moral
hazard — a ﬁrm that is riskier or involves greater disutility hires a less talented CEO. The loss in
eﬃciency is decreasing in the dispersion of ﬁrm size and size elasticity of talent, and increasing
in the dispersion of managerial ability. If poor corporate governance instead manifests in a
random assignment of CEOs to ﬁrms, the losses are signiﬁcantly higher, and aﬀected by the
above parameters in the opposite direction.
Cross-sectional changes in risk and disutility increase the level of pay. Thus, risky ﬁrms not
only hire less talented CEOs, but also pay their CEOs highly (relative to their skill level) as
compensation. However, aggregate changes in these variables have no impact as they aﬀect the
current ﬁrm and outside options equally. The strength of incentives is increasing in the disutility
of eﬀort, but independent of risk and risk aversion if the CEO only aﬀects mean returns. If
value-enhancing actions by the CEO also increase ﬁrm risk, the contract slope generally rises
and exhibits a positive relationship with both risk and risk aversion.
While a number of the model’s predictions regarding pay and incentives are consistent with
existing empirical ﬁndings, some predictions regarding talent assignment are yet to be tested
(given the diﬃculties of measuring talent) and are potentially fruitful topics for future empirical
research.22 In terms of future theoretical directions, it would be interesting to extend the
analysis to a dynamic model where CEOs can be ﬁred or voluntarily move between jobs. Axelson
and Bond (2009) consider a dynamic market equilibrium under risk-neutrality, and Tsuyuhara
(2009) assumes homogeneous agents and ﬁrms. Whether tractability can be preserved under
the combination of dynamics, risk aversion and skill diﬀerences is an open question.
22See Acharya, Gabarro and Volpin (2010), Chang, Dasgupta and Hilary (2010) and Nguyen and Nielsen
(2010) for promising approaches to measuring talent.
28AP r o o f s
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
This is a special case of Theorem 1 of EG. EG have the utility function (() − ());
our utility function (4) is a particular case of this with ()=(1−Γ)
1−Γ and ()=l n .W e
refer the reader to EG for the full proof, which does not use ﬁrst-order conditions and rules out
contracts that are stochastic or depend on messages. Here we give a heuristic proof that conveys
the intuition, so that the intuition is self-contained within this paper. Given  = + +,t h e
agent’s expected utility is given by
 []=
"¡




Since  is known when the agent takes his action, we can remove the expectations operator.
The IC condition is thus:
 ∈ arg max
∈[]
( +  + )
−() (33)
Taking the ﬁrst order condition yields:

0 ( +  + )
−() − 
0 ()






Since this must hold state-by-state (i.e. for every possible  and  found on the equilibrium
path), this integrates to
ln = Λ + 
Proof that maximum eﬀort is optimal if s is suﬃciently large
Consider a CEO with a reservation utility  = (ln),w h e r e is the “eﬀective” dollar




the support of   () its density, and  ()=





















From condition (28) in EG (applied to ()=+ and ()=l n ,a n d−1() = ),
the ﬁrm wishes to implement  for all  if:
  
This condition requires ﬁrm value  to be suﬃciently large compared to the CEO’s eﬀective
29wage .
P r o o fo fE q u a t i o n( 8 )
The CEO’s wage is:
ln = Λ +  = Λ( + )+ = 
0 + 
0
with 0 = Λ, 0 = Λ + . Thus his expected wage is:
















































































































T h eC E Or e c e i v e st h es a m eu t i l i t ya si fh eh a dt oe x e r tn oe ﬀort, and received a ﬁxed wage
−.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1
This proof consists of four steps.
Step 1: Eﬀective sizes. This is derived in the proof in the main paper.
Step 2. Distribution of eﬀective sizes. We use the notations

0 =   = 
0  = 
0
We use the interpretation of  as a quantile to simplify the algebra. Since  ()=−,t h e
30distribution of sizes follows  ( ≥ )=( )
−1. Averaging over all  yields the following
distribution function for eﬀective sizes b  = −:
b  ()=
³






























We will use the  to denote the rank in eﬀective size, and  for the rank in actual size. The




= , i.e. the eﬀective size of the ﬁrm




Step 3. Assignment in eﬀective sizes. A ﬁrm with eﬀective rank  optimizes over the talent
rank  of the manager it wishes to hire:
max
 b 
 () () − ()
which yields b  ()0 () − 0 ()=0 . In the competitive equilibrium, there is matching





Let  denote the eﬀective reservation wage of the least talented CEO ( = ). We obtain






0 () + 


































31Step 4. Wages. The rank of a ﬁrm with eﬀective size − is:

















In other words, a ﬁrm with size rank  hires a manager with size talent rank  = − (at
least in the upper tail, i.e. in the domain of the power law speciﬁcation). It pays an eﬀective
























Finally, substituting ∗ = −





















As u ﬃcient condition for the risk premium to increase with the wage
Consider a general utility function  = (1−Γ)(()−())
1−Γ where  is concave; the core model
corresponds to ()=l n . From EG, the optimal contract is  = −1 (Λ + ).F r o m t h e




where  = −()+ln
£
Λ¤
−Γ(Λ22)2  0. Hence, (eﬀective wage)=Λ+ +,a n d
so the risk premium is given by
 −  (Λ +  + )
where  = −1.
Suppose now that  increases a small amount ∆ and Λ+ increases  such that +∆ =
 [ (Λ +  + )]. The risk premium becomes  + ∆ −  (Λ +  +  + ).F o r t h e r i s k
premium to be increasing in ,w er e q u i r e
 + ∆ −  (Λ +  +  + ) −  (Λ +  + )
32i.e.
∆ (Λ +  +  + ) −  (Λ +  + )=
0 (Λ +  + )
since  is small. We have
∆ =  [ (Λ +  + )] −  [ (Λ + )] = [
0 (Λ + )]
and so we require
 [
0 (Λ + )] 
0 (Λ +  + ).
Since  is concave,  is convex and so 00  0. Since also 0,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that
 [0 (Λ + )] ≥ 0 (Λ + ). Thus, it is suﬃcient for 0 to be weakly convex (i.e. 000 ≥ 0)
for the risk premium to be increasing in the wage; multiplicative preferences are not necessary.
Proof that the market equilibrium is constrained-eﬃcient
We prove that if a social planner faces the same informational constraints as the agents in
the model (in particular, she cannot observe CEO eﬀort), she cannot ﬁnd a Pareto-dominant
allocation. Using the same argument as in the “Proof that maximum eﬀort is optimal if 
is suﬃciently large”, for a given CEO-ﬁrm pair, the social planner wishes the CEO to exert
maximum eﬀort (because the beneﬁts of eﬀort are suﬃciently large) and seeks the cheapest
contract that implements this eﬀort level. We have shown that this is the contract in Proposition
1. Given this, the market assignment is Pareto optimal, as is well-known (see, e.g., Gretsky,
Ostroy and Zame (1999)). For completeness, we provide a proof sketch.
Consider two ﬁrms  and , who are matched in a decentralized equilibrium with two CEOs,
 and . We normalize  =1and deﬁne  = .T h u s ,i fﬁrm  hires CEO ,i tm u s tp a ya n
eﬀective wage  and a dollar wage .S i n c eﬁrm  appoints CEO  rather than CEO :
 −  ≥  −  (35)
and likewise because ﬁrm  appoints CEO  rather than CEO :
 −  ≥  −  (36)
We study whether the social planner can achieve a Pareto improvement, i.e. increase total
production
P
 net of wages, subject to each CEO  receiving a utility at least , the utility
given by the market outcome. If the planner pairs ﬁrm  with CEO , while paying CEO 
at least  (and doing the symmetrical arrangement for ﬁrm  and CEO ), the surplus he
achieves is  +  −  − . By adding (35) and (36), this is weakly less than the
initial surplus,  +  −  − . This completes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2































Turning to ,a sw eh a v es h o w ni nt h ef u l lp r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 ,aﬁrm with size rank 










Since  ()=max − 










































0 () by (34)
























With small distortions, we can take Taylor expansions. As only − m a t t e r s ,i ti ss u ﬃcient



































































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3















1 − 0 + 

Given  ()=max − 






 () = max −
































































(1 − 0 + )
∙









1 − 0 + 





P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
35(i) In the corporate sector,  increases by , while it remains constant in the non-corporate
sector.  thus changes to:































Therefore, in the limit of small ,w eh a v e


























(ii) Given the Pareto ﬁrm size distribution  ()=−,t h en u m b e ro fﬁrms with a size
greater than  is −1 for a constant  = 1.23 We normalize the initial  to 0. For
an o n - c o r p o r a t eﬁrm, the eﬀective size equals its actual size. Given the increase in disutility, a
corporate ﬁrm with eﬀective size  has real size . Thus, the probability that a ﬁrm has







Thus, the talent corresponding to a ﬁrm with eﬀective size  is:













Hence, a corporate ﬁrm of size  and thus eﬀective size − hires a manager of talent (for
23The proof is thus.  = − implies  =( )
−1 and thus  =( )
−1 . The left-hand side




























(iii) The value created by the corporate sector is given by  =
R
 () (),f o r in




 () () −
Z





















since (37) showed that −
R 
0 ()
 0 () = .
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2
We deﬁne  (1 2)=((1 2)).A t =2 , the IC condition is:
 ∈ argmax
2
( (1 2 + (1)2 + (1)) − 1 (1) − 2 (2))
Note that there is no expectations operator here, since all noise has been realized when the
CEO chooses 2 — this highlights the role of our timing assumption in achieving tractability.
We can thus remove (·) to yield:
 ∈ argmax
2
 (1 2 + (1)2)+(1) − 1 (1) − 2 (2)
The ﬁrst order condition is:

2




 (1 2)= (1)+
0
2 ()2.( 3 8 )
for some function  (1) to be determined.
We now consider the  =1IC constraint:
 ∈ argmax
2
1 [( (1 + 1)+Λ2 ( + (1)2 + (1)) − 1 (1) − 2 ())] (39)
37where 1 is the expectation conditional on 1.F r o m ()=(1−Γ)(1 − Γ),w eh a v et h e
following certainty equivalent formula for any constant  and random variable e :






















− 1 (1) − 2 ()
¶
for any 1.A sa b o v e ,w ec a nr e m o v et h e function to yield:
 ∈ argmax
1







− 1 (1) − 2 ()













1 (1)|1= =0 
which implies:
 (1)=0 + Λ11


























Combining this with (38) yields
 (1 2)= (1)+Λ22 = 0 + Λ11 + Λ22
which generates the contract in Theorem 2.
Note that the above proof considers contracts that are message-free, deterministic and
diﬀerentiable. The techniques in EG formally prove that the optimal contract satisﬁes all
of these criteria.
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